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Retention Elections 2.010
By JAMES SAMPLE*
Introduction
COUNTER-HISTORICALLY, THE HIGHEST PROFILE judicial
campaigns of the first judicial elections cycle following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1 were
retention and ballot measure, rather than contested elections. Reten-
tion elections, in which voters cast their ballots either in favor of re-
turning the incumbent judge to office for another term or for her
removal, were intended to balance the values of judicial impartiality
and accountability to the public. If anything, historically, and with very
few exceptions, judicial retention races were non-events. The dynam-
ics this Article coins under the label “Retention 2.010,” however, re-
flect a seismic shift in that balance towards majoritarian accountability
that undermines the fundamental role of America’s state courts.
In Iowa, judicial retention elections—contests normally well be-
neath the radar even in Des Moines—became a national flashpoint
for same sex marriage debates and, more to the point, for interest
group spending in courts races.2 Also underscored by the 2009 Iowa
judicial retention election was the prisoner’s dilemma faced by judges
who are targeted by big dollar campaigns. Faced with that dilemma,
the Iowa Chief Justice and two Associate Justices did “not want to con-
tribute to the politicization of the judiciary,” and thus chose not to
engage in fundraising.3 Realistically, that tactical decision, more than
the Court’s unanimous 2009 decision in favor of same sex marriage,
cost them their seats on the bench.
* Associate Professor, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. B.A.
Boston College (1995). J.D., Columbia Law School (2003).
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges: Landmark Iowa Elections Send Tremor Through the
Judicial Retention System, ABA. J., Jan. 2011, at 56.
3. Josh Nelson, Chief Justice: Don’t Politicize Judicial System, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS
COURIER (Oct. 21, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/chief-justice-don-t-
politicize-judicial-system/article_722dbfe9-90d1-5ab3-b37f-a5a7f988e9ee.html.
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Conversely, Illinois Chief Justice Thomas Kilbride faced a well-
funded anti-retention effort—this one based on perceived anti-busi-
ness rulings, but Kilbride aggressively raised more than $1 million
from political parties, unions, and stakeholders before the bench, re-
sulting in what the Chicago Tribune described as “a $3 million fight
over a name most Illinoisans didn’t even see on the ballot.”4 Kilbride
retained his seat.
This Article examines the dynamics driving these events, particu-
larly in light of Citizens United’s potential to open the financial flood-
gates in state court races that, in their contested (as opposed to
retention) iterations over the past decade alone, have already become
soaked in campaign cash. For judicial retention elections nationally,
the opposition to retention in the 2010 Iowa and Illinois elections rep-
resents a bell that will never be un-rung. The strategies, attacks, and
expenditures in Iowa and Illinois will, nationally, come to represent
what I call Retention 2.010.
Part I of this Article proceeds by considering Citizens United and
judicial elections through the lenses, respectively, of the predictions as
to Citizens United’s impact on judicial races and the ambiguous early
returns from the first post-Citizens United election cycle. Part II offers
context as to the development of the merit selection systems with
which retention elections are often (though not exclusively) associ-
ated. Part III then examines controversial state court retention elec-
tions in California and Tennessee in both 1986 and 1996, which, in
retrospect, were precursors of Retention 2.010. Finally, Part IV looks
more closely at the events leading up to and constituting Retention
2.010, the judges and the array of other actors in Iowa and Illinois,
and the consequences of those events, both electorally and for the
rule of law.
Finally, this Article draws a lesson pertaining to Retention 2.010
from another significant event that occurred on Election Day, 2010.
Despite a concerted campaign that drew heavily on the prestige of
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Nevada voters rejected a proposal to
abandon contested elections, becoming the latest occasion in the last
quarter century in which voters around the country have—without ex-
ception—chosen to maintain contested elections.
4. Monique Garcia, State Supreme Court Justice Wins Retention Battle, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 2,
2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-02/news/ct-elect-kilbride-20101102_1_
jury-awards-retention-battle-constitutionality-of-state-law.
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I. Citizens United & Judicial Elections
This Part addresses predictions with regard to state judicial elec-
tions and their campaign financing in the wake of Citizens United.5
These overwhelmingly negative predictions note that there will un-
questionably be an increase in state judicial campaign expenditures,
almost certainly paralleled by increased party polarity on the newly
elected benches. The numbers in Subsection B show the increased
jump in judicial election expenditures from 2000–2009, prior to the
Court’s decision in Citizens United. However, Part I.B. also highlights
underlying factors which indicate that this data captures but a fraction
of the real influx of cash into these elections. Finally, Part I.C. ad-
dresses the effect Citizens United will have on judicial elections when
viewed in light of the Court’s decisions in White and Caperton.
A. Citizens United & Judicial Elections: The Predictions
Technically, the decision rendered in Citizens United had zero di-
rect applicability to state judicial campaigns. Instead, the 5-4 blockbus-
ter of Citizens United overturned limits on corporate and union general
treasury fund expenditures aimed at influencing only federal candi-
date elections.6 In derivative application, however, the reasoning in
Citizens United sweeps within its ambit state-based regulations, and thus
has potentially dramatic ramifications for state judicial campaigns. Jef-
frey Toobin, a staff writer at The New Yorker and the senior legal analyst
for CNN, frames this issue in this way:
I think judicial elections are really the untold story of Citizens
United, the untold implication. Because when the decision hap-
pened, a lot of people said, “Okay. This means that Exxon will
spend millions of dollars to defeat Barack Obama when he runs for
re-election.” I don’t think there’s any chance of that at all. That’s
too high profile. There’s too much money available from other
sources in a presidential race. But judicial elections are really a na-
tional scandal that few people really know about. Because corpora-
tions in particular, and labor unions to a lesser extent, have such
tremendous interest in who’s on state supreme courts and even
lower state courts that that’s where they’re going to put their
money and their energy because they’ll get better bang for their
buck there.7
Prior to Citizens United, many states had laws equivalent to the fed-
eral bans on spending corporate and union general treasury funds (as
5. 130 S. Ct. 876.
6. See id. at 917.
7. Interview by Bill Moyers with Jeffrey Toobin, (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://
www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/transcript2.html.
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opposed to via Political Action Committees (“PACs”)) in state cam-
paigns.8 “No such restrictions survive Citizens United, a stark reality
that . . . is likely to have a particularly pronounced effect on court
campaigns . . . .”9 Indeed, in a ninety-page dissenting opinion in Citi-
zens United, Justice John Paul Stevens pointed specifically to the deci-
sion’s impact on judicial races: “At a time when concerns about the
conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, the Court
today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general trea-
sury spending in these races.”10
It is worth noting that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had, along
with Justice Stevens, co-authored the 5-4 majority decision just six
years earlier in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.11 In contrast to
Citizens United, McConnell “sustain[ed] with few and trivial excep-
tions”12 the campaign regulations commonly known as the McCain-
Feingold laws—key portions of which were then struck down in Citi-
zens United.13 Justice O’Connor reacted to the Citizens United decision
in much the same way as Justice Stevens, asserting: “[T]he majority in
Citizens United has signaled that the problem of campaign contribu-
tions in judicial elections might get considerably worse and quite
soon . . . . [I]f both [unions and corporations] unleash their cam-
paign spending monies without restrictions, then I think mutually-as-
sured destruction is the most likely outcome.”14 Given that Citizens
United negated much of Justice O’Connor’s earlier decision in McCon-
nell, her comments are far from surprising.
Justice O’Connor’s visceral reaction is a product of at least two
factors. First, since stepping down from the Supreme Court, she has
devoted extraordinary time, effort, and attention to state judicial inde-
8. Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=19607#laws (last visited May 30, 2011).
9. James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign
Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 752 (2011).
10. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citation omitted).
11. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
12. Bob Bauer, Determining Legacy and Influence in the Appraisal of Justice O’Connor,
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (June 11, 2008), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/
news.html?AID=1281.
13. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 967 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 203–204,
116 Stat. 91, 92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
14. Adam Liptak, Former Justice O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/us/politics/27
judge.html.
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pendence,15 and in her view, Citizens United undermines the efficacy of
her tireless work. Second, Citizens United negates one of Justice
O’Connor’s signature decisions in that it “opened the door to corpo-
rate and union financing of broadcast ads right before an election”
and “moved away from a standard O’Connor had crafted to regulate
campaign financing.”16
Justice Stevens’ singling out of judicial campaigns in his Citizens
United dissent echoed an amicus brief filed by the Justice at Stake Cam-
paign on behalf of nineteen judicial reform groups.17 The brief pre-
dicted that ending the ban on corporate general treasury funding
would have dire consequences for state court campaigns. It further
asserted that “[s]pecial interest spending on judicial elections—by
corporations, labor unions, and other groups—poses an unprece-
dented threat to public trust in the courts and to the rights of liti-
gants,” and that “as other groups felt pressure to match this corporate
treasury spending, these issues would only snowball.”18 Amid the more
generalized controversies that followed the Citizens United opinion,19
15. See, e.g., Bill Mears, O’Connor Talks Politics, Judicial Independence, CNN POLITICAL
TICKER BLOG (Jan. 26, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/26/
oconnor-talks-politics-judicial-independence/.
16. Joan Biskupic, On the Reshaped Supreme Court, O’Connor’s Legacy Is Fading Away, USA
TODAY, June 10, 2008, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2008-06-09-oconnor_N.htm. Writing in 2008, USA Today’s veteran high court reporter Joan
Biskupic stated that “[n]otably absent among the current justices is an emphasis on how
the high court’s decisions affect the states,” whereas “O’Connor, a former Arizona state
senator who was the only former elected official on the court during her tenure,” conse-
quently “took a realistic view of the need for money in the system but also saw some of the
problems associated with it.” Id.
17. The amici submitting the brief consisted of Justice at Stake, American Judicature
Society, the Center for Governmental Studies, Citizen Advocacy Center, Common Cause,
Colorado Judicial Institute, Democracy North Carolina, the Illinois Campaign for Political
Reform, Justice For All (Arizona), Michigan Campaign Finance Network, North Carolina
Center for Voter Education, Ohio Citizen Action, Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Pu-
bic Campaign, Takeaction Minnesota, Texans for Public Justice, Transparency Interna-
tional USA, Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Chicago Appleseed, Chicago Council of
Lawyers, and Former Chief Justice Norman S. Fletcher (Georgia, Retired). Brief of Amici
Curiae Justice at Stake et al. in Support of Appellee, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (No. 08-205), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JAS_CU_Brief
_FA9AE1D6AB94E.pdf.
18. Id. at 19.
19. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Alito’s Reaction, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Jan. 27,
2010, 11:18 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/justice-alitos-reac-
tion/ (describing Justice Alito’s head shake “as if to rebut” Obama’s characterization of
Citizens United); Michael D. Shear, Obama Calls Citizens United Ruling ‘A Huge Blow,’ WASH.
POST (May 1, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/05/obama-calls-citizens-
united-ru.html (recounting President Obama voicing his displeasure with the court’s deci-
sion in front of the Supreme Court Justices during his State of the Union speech); Chief
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commentators picked up on these cues, recognizing the derivative ju-
dicial elections wrinkle to the case. As Dorothy Samuels of the New
York Times editorial board put the concern:
As I read over last week’s aggressively wrong 5-to-4 Supreme Court
decision greatly escalating the power of corporate and union
money in elections, my thoughts turned to former Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor.
That is not just because the ruling is another reminder of the
court’s rightward shift since Justice O’Connor was replaced by the
starkly conservative Justice Samuel Alito. Since retiring, Justice
O’Connor has been warning about the threat to judicial indepen-
dence from big-money state judicial campaigns and attack ads paid
for by special interests hoping to influence future court decisions.
The Citizens United ruling promises to make that problem worse,
possibly much worse.20
Due to wide variation, (including with regard to accuracy of ter-
minology), apples-to-apples comparisons of state campaign finance
laws are, at best, inexact. Still, against the above predictions and re-
flections, the National Institute on Money in State Politics offered an
empirical backdrop to the specter of Citizens United in the states, not-
ing that in the 2007–2008 elections:
• In the twenty-two states that restrict direct corporate donations
to candidates, individual donors provided 48% of the money.
Just 23% came from corporations via their associations, PACs,
etc. (Unions gave 5%, and the rest came from political parties,
which are often conduits for more corporate and union
money.)
• In the six states that permit unlimited corporate donations,
corporations provided 41% of the money, while individual do-
nors gave just 23%. (Union giving here was 8% and the rest via
political parties.)21
Justice John Roberts Found State of the Union Scene ‘Troubling,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/09/AR20100309036
72.html (characterizing as “troubling” the image of “one branch of government standing
up, literally surrounding the Supreme Court, cheering and hollering . . . while the court –
according to the requirements of protocol — has to sit there expressionless”). My own
thoughts with regard to the controversies created involving these meta-discussions are sum-
marized in James Sample, Roberts: Corporate $peech Good, Presidential Speech “Very Troubling,”
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-sample/rob-
erts-corporate-peech-g_b_493206.html.
20. Dorothy Samuels, Op-Ed., Hanging a ‘For Sale’ Sign over the Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/opinion/30sat4.
html.
21. Edwin Bender, Guest Opinion: Corporations’ Influence on Elections Will Grow, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/guest/arti-
cle_59f82a8e-12b6-11df-8976-001cc4c002e0.html.
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Commenting on that data, the Brennan Center for Justice at New
York University School of Law (“the Brennan Center”) asserts that the
“prospect of increased corporate spending in judicial elections in the
21 states where Citizens United invalidated corporate spending bans is
of particular concern because many of these states have already exper-
ienced some of the highest spending and nastiest races to date.”22
Concededly, if that statement is taken alone, it is certainly reasonable
to question the efficacy of the prior corporate spending bans in limit-
ing the role of cash in the courts ex ante. It warrants recognition, how-
ever, that the state corporate spending bans served only the same
limited, partial purposes that they served in the federal campaign sys-
tem prior to Citizens United. No one contends that the provisions,
standing alone, comprised comprehensive or effective regulation.
Counter-intuitively, but also perhaps correctly, the Brennan Center
further asserts that “even in states which have historically avoided the
most egregious judicial electioneering . . . Citizens United may usher in
a race to the bottom in terms of campaign finance practices.”23 Taken
together, the assertions are subject to the critique that the proponents
of campaign finance regulation effectively admit the ineffectiveness of
the corporate spending bans on the one hand, while simultaneously
claiming that Citizens United will increase the role of corporate money
in both states that had such bans and those that did not. Although
such a critique is fair, the reality may prove to be just as the Brennan
Center predicts.
Reflecting on Citizens United’s impact not merely on court races
generally, but on the types of jurists the decision would favor and dis-
favor, one theory is that the result of the decision would be to disad-
vantage the type of moderate, thoughtful jurists more inclined—at
the margins—to decide cases on narrow, case-by-case grounds. The
same impact would not be felt by those jurists who tend to render
decisions with the broad strokes more favored by wealthy interests at
the edges of divided legal and policy spectrums. The result will inevita-
bly polarize the bench “because more moderate candidates are un-
likely to be considered a bankable vote by any special interest group
investing heavily in judicial campaigns.”24 Phrased differently, in the
post-Citizens United era of judicial elections, arguably the type of candi-
22. Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 8, http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/BC
ReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=1 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
23. Id.
24. Samuels, supra note 20.
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date most likely to be disadvantaged in a close court contest is a
would-be jurist fashioned in the mold of Sandra Day O’Connor—ef-
fectively the critic in chief of the contests themselves.
Wherever one may fall on the spectrum of judicial ideologies, it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that in such a scenario, the resulting
vectors away from the ideological middle—in multiple directions—
are skewed, and that such skewing is not contrary vis-a`-vis the collec-
tive public interest. Arguing for campaign spending limits—as op-
posed to merely limits on contributions—in campaigns for court seats,
I have previously attempted to describe this skewing result from the
perspective of a hypothetical “wise but not wealthy candidate for judi-
cial office who faces a substantial independent expenditure cam-
paign.”25 In brief, such a candidate essentially has three options: she
can signal a disposition favorable to concentrated and moneyed inter-
ests who might then underwrite an independent expenditure cam-
paign supporting her and/or attacking her opponent (in a contested,
rather than retention race); she can embark on the “daunting and
statistically almost impossible”26 task of “raising enough money to
meaningfully counter the funded speech—even inaccurate funded
speech”; or she can “surrender—often before ever entering a race at
all, thereby creating an adverse selection problem that degrades the
quality of the courts, even apart from concerns about their
impartiality.”27
In a troubling twist, it is in states that have direct campaign con-
tribution limits where the second of these options is made all the
more difficult. While moneyed groups and individuals can spend un-
limited sums, the candidate can only raise money in capped contribu-
tions, necessitating ever more time and energy devoted to the task of
fundraising. Josh Rozenkranz aptly describes the interplay of unlim-
ited expenditures and the restricted supply of capped contributions as
turning “decent, honest politicians” into “junkies . . . caught in the
political equivalent of an arms race in which neither side feels safe to
disarm unilaterally.”28 To this very point, a May 2011 New York Times
article about the frantic pace of fundraising in Texas congressional
races, well in advance of the 2012 elections, noted that “[t]he fund-
raising effort reflects the modern campaign cycle and the $2,500 limit
25. Sample, supra note 9, at 756.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in “Faulty Assumptions”: A Response to Pro-
fessor Smith’s Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867, 889 (1998).
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on individual donations—both of which require candidates to seek
campaign money all the time rather than only during the immediate
prelude to an election.”29 The contrast of that reality for candidates—
and the unconstrained purview of those who engage in six- and seven-
figure independent expenditure campaigns—is one that both propo-
nents and opponents of campaign finance regulation decry, though
they “solve” the problem in opposite manners.30
B. Citizens United & Judicial Elections: Ambiguous Early Returns
The dire predictions regarding Citizens United’s impact on judicial
elections benefit from a contextual background that almost assures
their infallibility—spending in judicial elections seems as likely to de-
crease over the near term as does gravity over the same period. A re-
cent empirical study of campaign spending in judicial elections found
that “[f]rom 2000–09, Supreme Court candidates raised $206.9 mil-
lion nationally, more than double the $83.3 million raised from
1990–1999 (by comparison, the consumer price index rose only 25%
from 2000–2009).”31 The overall national aggregate increase may ac-
tually understate the degree to which, on a state-by-state basis, expen-
sive court campaigns have become the norm, rather than the
exception. As the study notes, “[d]uring the earlier decade, 26 Su-
preme Court campaigns raised $1 million or more, and all but two
came from three states: Alabama, Pennsylvania and Texas. In
2000–09, by contrast, there were 66 ‘“million dollar’” campaigns, in a
dozen states.”32
However, these figures tell only a partial story, and one that is
becoming decreasingly complete with each passing election cycle.
This is because the figures account only for direct contributions to
29. Matt Stiles & Ryan Murphy, Fund-Raising for ’12 Elections Sets Fast Pace, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2011, at A23A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06ttcash.html
?src=recg.
30. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Begin-
ning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1757 (2001) (noting “the rejec-
tion of critical elements of Buckley by a majority of the justices” at the time, and that
“Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Stevens . . . expressly called either for overruling of
Buckley entirely or for overruling key elements of the decision” while Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg “expressed the hope that Buckley could be salvaged through significant reinter-
pretation, including the modification of . . . the contribution/expenditure distinction”).
31. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2000–2009: DEC-
ADE OF CHANGE 8 (Charles Hall ed., 2010), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/me-
dia/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf.
32. Id.
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court campaigns. Yet, even the most conservative measurements33 of
television advertising—by far the biggest driver of campaign costs—
reflect that “[s]pecial-interest groups and party organizations ac-
counted for . . . more than 40 percent of the estimated TV air time
purchases in 2000–09.”34 In 2008, special-interest groups and political
parties accounted for fifty-two percent of all TV spending nationally—
the first time that noncandidate groups outspent the candidates on
the ballot.35
A substantial portion of the noncandidate spending is being fu-
eled by a concentrated few, who are investing in court races in a dis-
proportionately large manner. In the prior decade, the top five
spenders in twenty-nine state high court campaigns in the nation’s ten
costliest judicial election states—a total of 145—spent an average of
$473,000 each.36 The result is that “a large number of justices in those
states owe their elections to a few key benefactors.”37 While just one
such “super spender” in these races was an individual, the $3 million
in expenditures contributed by Chairman and CEO of Massey Energy
Co., Don Blankenship, in the 2004 West Virginia judicial election was
so conspicuously “generous” that it led to the landmark recusal discus-
sion had in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.38 Insofar as Citizens United
frees up the general treasuries of two key traditional combatants in
judicial elections—corporations and labor unions—it opens the door
for isolated “super spenders” inclined to play an ever more outsized
role in court campaigns.
Given the number of judicial elections states that lacked Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act-equivalent general treasury bans prior to
Citizens United—as well as the arguably limited efficacy of the bans in
some of the more expensive judicial elections states that did employ
them—it is possible that critics of Citizens United are exaggerating con-
33. With regard to the conservatism of the estimates, the study notes, these estimated
costs of airtime in the New Politics of Judicial Elections are calculated and supplied by TNS
Media Intelligence/CMAG, which uses satellite technology to track advertising in the na-
tion’s 100 largest media markets. Id. Consequently, the ads “do not include either ad
agency commissions or the costs of production” nor do they include the costs of advertise-
ments in smaller media markets. As such, while the estimates unequivocally understate the
actual expenditures, they also represent the best available data for comparison purposes.
See id. at 37.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.; Erwin Chemerinsky & James J. Sample, Op-Ed., You Get the Judges You Pay For,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/opin-
ion/18sample.html.
36. SAMPLE, supra note 31, at 10–11.
37. Sample, supra note 9, at 751.
38. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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cerns that the decision will open the money floodgates to court races
already awash in cash.
Weighing against the argument that the concerns are exagger-
ated, however, is this: The practical effect of the decision as applied to
judicial races is that of a one-way ratchet—eliminating the general
treasury bans where they existed and maintaining the status quo
where they did not. As such, it is distinctly possible that some multis-
tate corporations, faced with a complex and constantly changing
patchwork of inconsistent state-by-state regulation, and who may have
previously considered substantial spending in judicial races to be an
inefficient proposition, will now decide that it is in their interests to
take advantage of the across-the-board simplicity of a deregulated,
post-Citizens United landscape. Viewed from the perspective of the gen-
eral counsel’s office in a multistate39 corporation, the clarity and uni-
formity following Citizens United surely makes substantial engagement
in judicial election spending, at the very least, less of a legal and logis-
tical burden than it was prior to the decision.40 If that perspective on
reduced burdens holds sway, then Citizens United will increase corpo-
rate judicial election expenditures even in states where such expendi-
tures were not legally curtailed in the past. In such a scenario, despite
an in-state de jure status quo, court races will be dramatically different
de facto. And the dire predictions will prove correct.
39. The term “multistate” is used in this context merely as shorthand for a corpora-
tion with significant business interests—and thus significant interests in the courts—in sev-
eral or all of the states.
40. There is some anecdotal evidence, in non-judicial election settings, of a risk of
customer backlash when a corporation, particularly a recognizable retail conglomerate,
takes advantage of the opportunities opened up by Citizens United. Perhaps the highest-
profile example involves Target. As framed by the Washington Post: “When Target gave
money . . . to a pro-business group in Minnesota, the company thought it was helping its
bottom line by backing candidates in its home state who support lower taxes.” Jia Lynn
Yang & Dan Eggen, Exercising New Ability to Spend on Campaigns, Target Finds Itself a Bull’s Eye,
WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/08/18/AR2010081806759.html. The result, however, was more complex, such that,
“[i]nstead, the retailer has found itself in a fight with liberal and gay rights groups that has
escalated into calls for a nationwide boycott and protests at the company’s headquarters
and stores.” Id. The backlash against Target in the Minnesota state race at issue, however,
did not dissuade other major corporations such as 3M, from spending in the same way, in
the very same race. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Flimflam Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010,
at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/opinion/06krugman.html. For
a fuller treatment of this issue, and although I don’t agree with all of his suggestions, Bruce
Freed of the Center for Political Accountability offers suggestions as to how corporations
can “take advantage of newfound freedom after the Supreme Court’s Citizens United deci-
sion without being ‘Target-ed.’” Bruce Freed, How Companies Can Limit Political Spending
Risks, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-freed/
how-companies-can-limit-p_b_836088.html.
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C. Citizens United & Judicial Elections: Justice Kennedy
Deconstructed
“Far from undermining arguments for differential treatment of
judicial elections, Citizens United underscores their very differences.”41
Although a more fulsome analysis of Justice Kennedy’s divergent ap-
proaches in writing the opinions for the Court in both Caperton42 and
Citizens United is beyond the scope of this Article,43 Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in the latter strains to distinguish his opinion in the former.
Most directly, in Citizens United Justice Kennedy writes that “Caperton’s
holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not
that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.”44
There is no disputing the “salient differences between the ex post
remedy of constitutionally mandated recusal due to independent ex-
penditures, and upholding ex ante limits on the expenditures them-
selves.”45 On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that “Caperton’s
holding was limited”46 to the narrower question in part because that
was the precise and only question before the Court. Conversely, in
Citizens United—as in the string of campaign finance cases from Buckley
v. Valeo47 through Citizens United’s precursor, McConnell v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission48—the Court analyzed federal statutes applicable to
federal elections, which, by definition, do not include judicial
appointments.
Further, relative to the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence,
even the “limited” holding of Caperton is actually rather dramatic in
41. Sample, supra note 9, at 773.
42. 129 S. Ct. 2252.
43. In Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and
Equality, I trace Justice Kennedy’s opinions involving state judicial elections, beginning with
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), and continuing through Lo´pez
Torres v. New York State Board of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 171–81 (2d Cir. 2006). Sample, supra
note 9.
44. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
45. Sample, supra note 9, at 772.
46. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
47. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that (1) the provision in Federal Election Campaign
Act limiting individual contributions to campaigns is constitutional; (2) provisions limiting
the amount spent by candidates on their own behalf violate their right to free speech; (3)
provisions limiting total expenditures in campaigns are unconstitutional; (4) provisions
limiting individual spending, independent of a candidate but incidental to the candidate
violate free speech; (5) the reporting requirements of the Act are constitutional; and (6)
the Federal Election Commission created by the Act violates the Appointments Clause).
48. 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, including the restrictions on the use of corporate and union funds for “election-
eering communications,” but this holding was later overturned by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876).
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the sense that “Caperton’s fundamental holding is that judicial elec-
tions are different. One cannot conceive of a court holding that a
legislator (or executive) would be barred from acting in X matter be-
cause a campaign supporter was involved.”49 Schotland’s point as to
differential treatment applies, a fortiori in a circumstance where, as in
Caperton itself, the “campaign supporter” he references is not a con-
tributor—over whom the Court’s jurisprudence allows some curtailing
even in legislative and executive contexts—but an “independent”
spender—over whom the same jurisprudence in non-court races, does
not.50
Post-Caperton, those who assert that legally, judicial elections are
subject to the same rules as legislative and executive races51 have al-
ready lost the argument and are attempting to re-litigate (both aca-
demically and actually) settled questions. Ironically, the purported
foundation of the arguments for non-differential treatment is gener-
ally the Court’s holding in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. In
White, the Court held that a state canon of judicial conduct that pro-
hibited judicial candidates from announcing their views on issues
“likely to come before the candidate” failed First Amendment strict-
scrutiny analysis.52 That holding, combined with ambiguity as to just
how far White reached, spawned a plethora of challenges to other less
restrictive judicial canons.53 However, those pushing the theory—on
the basis of White—that judicial and non-judicial elections must be
subject to identical rules, did so by selectively reading White itself. Jus-
tice Scalia’s majority opinion expressly stated that “we neither assert
nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial
office to sound the same as those for legislative office.”54 Likewise, the
49. Roy A. Schotland, Caperton Capers: Comment on Four of the Articles, 60 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 337, 344 (2010).
50. See Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign
Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1198–99 (2007).
51. See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections:
Davis, White, and the Future of Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 195, 205, 231 (2008)
(asserting that reformers “should not make the mistake, however, of equating increases in
the amount of money spent on judicial campaigns with an increase in corruption” in spite
of the fact that in the judicial, as opposed to legislative and executive contexts, preventing
the perception or actuality of mere influence, rather than corruption, is the compelling
state interest).
52. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 771 (2002).
53. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 297–98
(2008) (surveying challenges to the canons).
54. White, 536 U.S. at 783. Indeed, Tom Phillips recently wrote “[i]n and of itself,
White . . . was hardly a remarkable decision, as it affected only one obsolete provision that
seemed patently overbroad.” Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges
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“fundamental” difference that Roy Schotland points to in Caperton was
previewed by none other than Justice Kennedy who concurred in
White but wrote that “[s]tates may choose to ‘adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires.’”55 Thus, while White ulti-
mately stood for less than some claimed at the beginning, the holding
in Caperton makes clear that judges—even elected judges—are
different.
For now, as described above, speculation as to the impact of Citi-
zens United on campaign spending in judicial elections remains mostly
just that—speculative. While the one-way ratchet of Citizens United in-
creases the pools of capital available for spending in elections, the
degree of impact it has on judicial races, as opposed to non-judicial
races, over the next several years will turn, in significant part, on the
degree of difference that states, and subsequently the courts, find
applicable.
II. Retention Elections and “Merit Selection” in Context
A. The Development of a Hybrid
Given the ambiguities described in Part I with respect to Citizens
United’s impact on judicial elections, it is easy to make the mistake of
confusing correlation with causation. During the limited sample of
the 2010 election cycle, the most notable dynamic—which may or may
not bear any causal relationship to Citizens United—was the emergence
of retention elections as major campaign spending battlegrounds.
Although retention elections occur for judges who reach the
bench in a variety of different manners,56 these elections are most fre-
and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 691, 698
(2007).
55. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (quoting White,
536 U.S. at 794).
56. Judges may face retention after: (1) election; (2) interim appointments to fill va-
cancy; or (3) hybrid selection/election system. Illinois, as described in infra Part IV, is a
state in which they follow an election model. Missouri and South Carolina, on the other
hand, are two examples of states in which an independent committee decides whether or
not a judge will be retained. Methods of Judicial Selection: Retention Evaluation Programs, AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/judicial_
performance_evaluations.cfm?state= (last visited June 7, 2011) [hereinafter Methods of Judi-
cial Selection]. Lastly, a hybrid method, as adopted in New Mexico, has an independent
commission which evaluates the judges mid-term and before the retention election. Id.
“Evaluations are based on a self-assessment, surveys of those who have come into contact
with the judge, and a personal interview.” Id. The evaluations made before the retention
election are then posted on the commission’s website and published in state newspapers.
Id.
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quently associated with the commission-based appointment process
commonly referred to as “merit selection”—which is also occasionally
and perhaps more descriptively referred to as commission-based ap-
pointment.57 Contextually, merit selection systems fit into what Char-
lie Geyh describes as “the struggle to balance independence and
accountability [that] has played itself out over the course of more
than two centuries, as five distinct methods of selecting judges—each
striking the balance in different ways—have vied for preeminence.”58
The two-century long struggle “is still going strong”59 despite the
fact that, in the words of one scholar, the “main elements of the con-
troversy have not varied, and the question posed has remained the
same: Is it more appropriate in a constitutional republic supposedly
governed by the rule of law to have judges appointed by an executive or
elected by the people?”60 Merit selection systems are largely inspired by
the idea of eliminating the mutual exclusivity of that choice. The sys-
tems aim to serve the Hamiltonian interest in preserving an indepen-
dent judiciary while retaining public accountability.61 Accordingly,
merit selection is, to some extent, a “hybrid between [the] appoint-
ment and election” methods of seating a member of the judiciary.62
While systems vary in structure from state to state, the consistent
elements include a nonpartisan nominating commission used to “lo-
57. Editorial, Saving the Missouri Plan, 91 JUDICATURE 160, 210 (2008). While there is a
vibrant and seemingly never-ending debate among election and appointment proponents
and others as to the propriety of the term “merit selection,” that debate is both beyond the
scope of this Article, and, in the view of the author, ultimately circular and unhelpful.
Whether rightly or wrongly on the merits, the term “merit selection” has become a term of
art. Consequently, this Article uses both of the terms—“merit selection” and “commission-
based appointments”—without endorsing or contesting the issue on the merits (so to
speak). To the extent that this meta-discussion on nomenclature may be of interest see, for
example, Rachel Paine Caufield, What Makes Merit Selection Different?, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 765, 767 nn.7–8 (2010); Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections,
64 ARK. L. REV. 249 (2011); Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The
Need to Develop a Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REV.
597, 598 n.4 (2005).
58. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1261 (2008). Geyh notes, in particular,
that “[i]n the fledgling states, all judges were selected by one of two methods: Gubernato-
rial appointment with legislative confirmation (five states) or legislative appointment
(eight states).” Id.
59. John L. Dodd et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Judicial Appointments,
33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 354 (2002).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See Ryan L. Souders, Note, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elections in
the United States, 25 REV. LITIG. 529, 569 (2006).
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cate, recruit, investigate, and evaluate”63 judicial candidates in devis-
ing a short list of nominees—generally two to seven per vacancy64—
followed by the appointment by a state official—often the governor.65
The judicial nominating commission—made up of lawyers and non-
lawyers, appointed in part by the state bar association, state officials,
and by other (optimally) diverse members of the local legal commu-
nity—screens and selects candidates based on meritorious qualifica-
tions rather than various political interests.66
Depending on the particular state guidelines, the subsequent gu-
bernatorial selection may serve to fill the vacancy on the bench, or the
plan may require legislative or executive council confirmation.67 Un-
like the federal appointment of Article III Judges, state judges are ap-
pointed to serve the judiciary for a limited term.68 At the close of their
term limit, judges appointed through the merit selection system are
evaluated for retention either by a commission or by way of a reten-
tion election. Retention elections generally subject incumbent judges
seeking to serve a subsequent term to a general election, which is
aimed at depoliticizing judicial selection and promoting indepen-
dence and impartiality in the adjudication process.69 However, instead
of running opposite (an)other judicial candidate(s), voters cast a bal-
lot in which a majority vote often secures a judge’s retention—a mi-
nority vote generally restarts the process of merit selection.70
Merit selection systems are often referred to as adopting the “Mis-
souri Plan,” a byproduct of Missouri becoming the first state to adopt
this system in 1940, and were first conceived during the Progressive
Movement.71 Prior to the creation of merit selection, judges ap-
pointed to the courts were thought to be “in the pocket” of the politi-
cal machine, and those elected were considered mere “rubber-stamp
confirmations of the machine’s slate.”72 Elected judges were placed
63. Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best Judges, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://
www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/ms_descrip_1185462202120.pdf (last visited
Nov. 24, 2011) [hereinafter JMS: The Best Way].
64. Judicial Merit Selection: Current Status, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, at tbl.3, http://www.
judicialselection.us/uploads/Documents/Judicial_Merit_Charts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011) [hereinafter JMS: Current Status].
65. Id. at tbl.2.
66. JMS: The Best Way, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 MO. L. REV. 605, 610 (2009).
70. See Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 56.
71. Dodd et al., supra note 59, at 362; see Souders, supra note 62, at 569.
72. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to Republi-
can Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV.
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on the bench as a consequence of their party affiliation rather than
their qualifications and were increasingly viewed to be incompetent
and corrupt.73 The conflicting interests in strengthening the judici-
ary’s responsiveness to the public and in creating politically indepen-
dent state judiciaries gave birth to the merit selection process in which
nominating commissions selected a group of candidates for appoint-
ment by the governor.74
B. Retention Rhetoric v. Retention Reality
Today, led by the American Judicature Association, many Balkan-
ized reform groups advocate for the adoption of merit selection as
opposed to contested, partisan judicial elections, arguing that such
elections threaten to undermine the integrity of the judiciary.75 Reten-
tion elections, despite their overlap with more traditional contests,
have long been an awkward, forced fit for many proponents of an
appointed judiciary. The inclusion of retention elections within the
merit selection system contributes to the responsiveness of the judici-
ary to its electorate, which seems to undermine the goal of appoint-
ment proponents to achieve an independent judiciary. That
awkwardness is perceived to be somewhat mitigated because retention
elections are devoid of “traditional voting cues including party labels,
candidate appeals, incumbency, [and] campaigns.”76 Further, reten-
tion elections have historically resulted in an overwhelming—indeed
nearly unanimous—majority of incumbent judges being retained for
an additional term, which critics signal in challenging the effective-
ness of increased accountability.77
One consequence of nearly statistically certain retention is to
shift all of the practical selection to the appointment rather than the
election part of the process. This consequence is heartily welcomed by
opponents of judicial elections who could thus “safely” advocate for
625, 627 (2005); J. Clark Kelso, Judicial Elections: Practices and Trends, MCGEORGE SCH. L., 11
(1999), http://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/centers/government/ccglp_pubs_judicial
_elections_practices_and_trends_pdf.pdf.
73. See Caufield, supra note 72, at 627.
74. See Dodd et al., supra note 59, at 361.
75. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1086
(2007).
76. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, The Friends and Neighbors Effect in Judicial Retention
Elections, 40 W. POL. Q. 703, 703 (1987).
77. JEROME R. CORSI, JUDICIAL POLITICS—AN INTRODUCTION 112 (1984) (noting that
“[i]n the forty-five-year history of retention election [through 1980] . . . only 1.6 percent of
all judges in retention elections were defeated”); see also William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin,
What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 342 (1987).
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the merit selection hybrid, and even tout the system’s accountability
mechanism to voters with little fear that the actually disfavored elec-
tive component of that hybrid would prove meaningful.
A shift towards merit selection in many states took place in the
1960s and 1970s.78 Fourteen states: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, and the District of
Columbia use a merit selection process.79 Yet, whatever momentum
merit selection generated in the 1960s and 1970s, it ran into a brick
wall in the 1980s.80 Changing the mode of selection for a state’s judi-
cial branch involves amending the state’s constitution, which com-
monly requires the approval not only of the legislature, but also of the
voters.81 Even where the former has existed, the latter has not for the
last quarter century, and “in recent decades voters have consistently
opposed merit selection”82—so consistently in fact that an American
Judicature Society website listing “unsuccessful reform efforts” on a
state-by-state basis is several pages in length.83 If anything, the pendu-
lum in terms of elections versus appointment is swinging in the oppo-
site direction with state legislatures—specifically Iowa, Arizona, and
Oklahoma—advancing bills seeking to modify or overturn their merit
selection systems. Those efforts have likewise been without significant
success.84
78. See Schotland, supra note 75, at 1086.
79. See Caufield, supra note 72, at 625, 628 n.23.
80. See Schotland, supra note 75, at 1086; see Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of
American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1478 (1987) (noting that “in every state but Delaware, an amend-
ment proposed by the legislature becomes law only when ratified by the electorate”).
81. See, e.g., Judicial Selection in the States: Nevada, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.
judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NV (last visited June 6, 2011) (not-
ing Nevada legislature approved, in 2007 and 2009, proposed constitutional amendments
calling for merit selection of Nevada judges); see also South Carolina’s State Government Struc-
ture, Including Judicial Selection, Balance of Power and the State Constitution, LIBERTY FELLOWSHIP
(Nov. 2010), http://www.libertyfellowshipsc.org/files/research/SC%20State%20Govern-
ment%20Structure_LF_Final.pdf (explaining requirements to amend South Carolina’s
constitution to method of judicial selection).
82. See Schotland, supra note 75, at 1086.
83. See History of Reform Efforts, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts.cfm?state= (last visited June 6,
2011) [hereinafter History of Reform Efforts].
84. See Bill Raftery, In Last Seven Days, Bills to Tweak, Modify, or End Merit Selection Ad-
vance in the IA House, AZ Senate, and OK Senate, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Mar. 9, 2011), http://
gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/03/09/in-last-seven-days-bills-to-tweak-modify-or-end-merit-se-
lection-advance-in-the-ia-house-az-senate-and-ok-senate/.
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Stasis in selection systems is the order of the day. Stasis in how
those systems operate, however, is decidedly not. Over the past dec-
ade, contested judicial elections have become, in the words of retired
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “political prizefights where partisans
and special interests seek to install judges who will answer to them
instead of the law and the Constitution.”85 Judicial election critics,
who recognize the consistent resistance of voters in elective states to
move to appointive judiciaries, attempt to persuade voters that a move
to merit selection will not diminish voters’ influence because of the
accountability represented by the retention vote. Consider again, for
comparative and illustrative purposes, the words of Justice O’Connor,
this time advocating for merit selection in an op-ed article in the New
York Times:
A better system is one that strikes a balance . . . by providing for the
open, public nomination and appointment of judges, followed in
due course by a standardized judicial performance evaluation and,
finally, a yes/no vote in which citizens either approve the judge or vote him
out. This kind of merit selection system—now used in some form in
two-thirds of states—protects the impartiality of the judiciary with-
out sacrificing accountability.86
Strategically, from the perspective of those opposed to electing
judges, such a pro-voter pitch costs little when, even relative to histori-
cally “sleepy judicial elections,”87 retention races have long been the
sleepiest of all. The “sleepiest” characteristic is undoubtedly part cause
and part effect. Voter interest in contests that lack traditional adversa-
ries and in contests that generate incumbent retention rates of well
over ninety percent is low ex ante, and that low interest level becomes,
prospectively, a self-fulfilling prophesy.88 This dynamic is rarely, if
ever, expressly acknowledged by merit selection proponents—and cer-
tainly not when the system is being pitched to voters. Whether ac-
knowledged or not, the dynamic, from the perspective of merit
proponents, preserves judicial independence while creating the per-
ception—but rarely the actuality—of accountability to voters. Natu-
rally, opinions differ as to whether such a dynamic amounts to a
85. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 31, at 4.
86. Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010,
at WK9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html (em-
phasis added).
87. See David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judi-
cial Elections, 69 ALB. L. REV. 985, 985 (2006) (“[T]he future of many sleepy judicial elec-
tions may look increasingly more nightmarish . . . .”).
88. Corsi, supra note 77, at 112 (noting 1.6 percent success).
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virtuous or vicious circle.89 The 2010 judicial elections cycle, however,
indicates that historical norms are changing, and changing
dramatically.
C. Rose Bird & Penny White: The Precursors of Retention 2.010
Prior to 2010, the highest profile exceptions to the rules of sleepy
and near-certain retention campaigns occurred in California and Ten-
nessee in 1986 and 1996, respectively. In 1986, Californians voted
three state supreme court justices out of office.90 The justices in-
cluded, most notably, Rose Bird, who in addition to having been
elected the state’s first female supreme court justice nine years earlier,
became the “first chief justice in the modern history of the court to be
voted out of office.”91
Conventional wisdom holds—largely correctly—that Bird’s defeat
was attributable to her votes in capital cases. As one scholar notes,
“Bird, in the sixty-one capital cases heard by the California Supreme
Court while she served as Chief Justice, never voted to uphold a death
sentence.”92 Along with Bird, two associate justices who were fre-
quently with Bird in the court’s liberal majority at the time, Joseph R.
Grodin and Cruz Reynoso, were also defeated, though by narrower
margins.93 The morning after the vote, the Los Angeles Times reported
that, “[a]fter nine years in the job, Bird fell victim to a multimillion-
dollar campaign that focused on her long record of voting to overturn
death sentences. Bird’s ‘box score,’ as it came to be known, of 61 re-
versals in 61 capital cases became a constant refrain of the cam-
paign . . . .”94 Although Reynoso (the first Latino member of the
89. Unsurprisingly, opponents of merit selection systems recognize the same dynamic
but see it as anything but virtuous. See CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DE-
FENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 5 (2009) (challenging claims of judicial elections opponents
and raising concerns about “the lack of independence from the other political institutions
in appointive systems”).
90. Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court’s Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986,
§1, at 1.
91. Id.; see also John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 349 (1987)
(identifying the 1986 retention election as the first one in which the chief justice was re-
jected by the public).
92. Patrick K. Brown, The Rise and Fall of Rose Bird: A Career Killed by the Death Penalty,
CAL. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, 1, http://cschs.org/02_history/images/CSCHS_2007-Brown.pdf
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
93. Clifford, supra note 90; John H. Culver & Chantel Boyens, Political Cycles of Life and
Death: Capital Punishment as Public Policy in California, 65 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1003 (2002).
94. Clifford, supra note 90.
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state’s high court) and Grodin had initially “appeared safer,”95 “a
strong television push by opponents during the last month of the cam-
paign kept their names before the voters, insisting that all three jus-
tices needed to lose if the death penalty [was] to be enforced.”96
To put into perspective just how exceptional this event truly was,
the 1986 defeat of the three justices marked the first time any justice
of the state’s high court had been voted out of office since the state
implemented its appointment-followed-by-retention system—a change
that took place in 1934.97 Several scholars have concluded that “the
death penalty was not the primary motive for conservatives who
wanted [Bird’s] ouster, [but] rather it was the most powerful weapon
they could use to influence the electorate . . . .”98 An editorial pub-
lished in the New York Times during the campaign framed it this way:
Don’t believe for a moment that the campaign to oust Chief Justice
Rose Bird from the California Supreme Court is a spontaneous
public uprising. Four groups working to defeat her reconfirmation
have raised more than $5.6 million, much of it through direct mail
to previous contributors on conservative mailing lists.
. . . Don’t believe, either, that the effort to get rid of Chief
Justice Bird . . . is nonpartisan. Gov. George Deukmejian, a Repub-
lican up for re-election; Mike Curb, the Republican candidate for
lieutenant governor, and Ed Zschau, the Republican candidate for
the U.S. Senate, have all campaigned openly against her.
. . . Don’t believe, finally, that the anti-Bird campaign is about
the death penalty, although that is the emotional issue that Mr.
Roberts, the Republicans and the right wing have fanned into near-
hysteria . . . .
Thus, the death penalty is only the trumped-up excuse for the
anti-Bird campaign—the actual purpose of which clearly is to put a
conservative majority on the California Supreme Court . . . . And a
deeper motive of the business groups involved in the anti-Bird cam-
paign—big contributors include the Independent Oil Producers
Agency and the Western Growers Association—was suggested when
Crime Victims for Court Reform issued a paper charging the Bird
court with being “anti-business.”99
Some scholars note, however, that “those who place the blame for
Bird’s defeat on funding by agri-business, the taxpayer revolt, and big
banking, and claim that such groups hid behind the death penalty
issue, while correct in their analysis, nonetheless seem to be apologists
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Brown, supra note 92, at 2.
99. Tom Wicker, In the Nation; A Naked Power Grab, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1986, § 4, at
25.
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for Bird.”100 In a sense, both assertions are correct—business provided
the funding—and it was also “evident . . . that the electorate made
their decision about Bird based on her rulings in death penalty
cases.”101 The fact that big business may have been behind the cam-
paign was of little concern to voters who were unaware of the corpo-
rate support. In a state in which, at the time, more than 80% of the
population supported the death penalty,102 Bird was “out of step with
their beliefs.”103 According to Patrick Brown, regardless of who may
have funded the campaign, the voters:
[D]id not care that Rose Bird was a woman; did not care that Rose
Bird was an enemy of big farmers; did not care that Rose Bird was
not a supporter of property tax reform. They only knew that, from
their perspective, Rose Bird did not care about victims of crime.104
Television advertising was instrumental in framing Bird’s cam-
paign, building on the dramatic factual foundation of her “box score.”
At that time, television advertising was very much a judicial anomaly,
but has since become the norm. Bird “did not raise half the amount of
money collected by her opponents,”105 and “her low-key commercials,
stressing the need for a judiciary that can make unpopular decisions
in the face of intense political pressure . . . was no match for the emo-
tional appeals of her opponents.”106
In a script, echoes of which have since played out in hundreds of
contested judicial elections, the “hallmark” commercial of the “emo-
tional appeals” against Bird—and secondarily against Reynoso and
Grodin—featured “the somber face of Marianne Frazier, the mother
of a murdered 12-year-old girl, sitting beside a framed picture of her
daughter and asking voters to defeat the three justices who had voted
to overturn the killer’s death sentence.”107 In Frazier’s words, “[y]our
vote can stop them from letting other killers escape justice . . . .”108
Defeating three justices in a state and system where no justice had
lost in a retention race in the sixty-two year history of the system took
not only money, but the kind of strategies that strategists traditionally
associated with a more bruising brand of politics. According to the Los
100. Brown, supra note 92, at 11.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 10–11.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id.
105. Clifford, supra note 90.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Frank Clifford, Anti-Bird Coalition’s $900,000 Radio-TV Ad Blitz Gets Going, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1986, § 1, at 24.
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Angeles Times, the “juggernaut aimed at Bird, Grodin[,] and Reynoso
enlisted some of the state’s most shrewd political operatives to fashion
a $10-million campaign,” led by strategist Bill Roberts, “who helped
manage Ronald Reagan’s first campaign for governor in 1966” as well
as some of the state’s top political consulting firms.109
In characteristics that, viewed with the perspective of hindsight,
foreshadowed Iowa in 2010, the political campaign inexperience and
indecisiveness of the justices and, perhaps more importantly, their
supporters, proved critical.“[T]here was confusion from the outset as
to how to conduct a vigorous campaign that would not drag the high
court into a political mud bath [and t]hat confusion dogged the cam-
paign to the end.”110 Finally, in addition to the preceding factors, the
justices—initially just Chief Justice Bird, but later the two associate jus-
tices as well—were opposed by “a statewide television blitz by Republi-
can candidates led by Gov. George Deukmejian.”111 Whatever the
division in portions among the various factors involved in the justices’
defeats, the political consequence was clear: their losses “set the stage
for a Republican governor to appoint a majority of the court for the
first time since the Great Depression.”112
Ten years after Bird, Grodin, and Reynoso (hereinafter inter-
changeably referred to both individually and collectively as “Bird”)
lost in California, a similar “first” occurred in the defeat of Tennessee
Supreme Court Justice Penny White.113 The lead sentences of the
Memphis Commercial Appeal’s report on White’s defeat reads as though
it was pulled directly from the Bird accounts:
Tennessee voters threw Justice Penny White off the state Supreme
Court Thursday after an unprecedented campaign by conservative
activists and victims advocates who labeled her soft-on-crime.
The stunning defeat, which surprised even the leaders of the
dump-White movement, means Gov. Don Sundquist will name his
first justice to the court. He has promised to choose only a justice
who supports the death penalty.
. . . .
White . . . was the target of a wildfire campaign that used a
handful of her rulings to cast her as an enemy of the death penalty
and a coddler of criminals.114
109. Clifford, supra note 90.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Paula Wade, White First Casualty of Yes-No Option on Judges Soft-on-Crime Charge Costs
Seat, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Aug. 2, 1996, at A1.
114. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN204.txt unknown Seq: 24 22-FEB-12 16:26
406 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
During the campaign against her, White and her supporters
noted that “she had upheld convictions in 85 percent of her cases as
an appellate judge,” but the “soft-on-crime charge resonated with vot-
ers” nonetheless.115 The campaign, however, successfully emphasized
one case in which White joined an opinion authored by Tennessee’s
then-Chief Justice A. A. Birch. In that case, the high court upheld a
murder and rape conviction but overturned the death penalty sen-
tence in the case and sent the matter back to the lower court for
resentencing.116
The campaign strategy was illustrated by a letter from John Da-
vies, who was then the president of the Tennessee Conservative
Union, to conservative Tennessee voters. News reports during the
campaign against White indicated that Davies’ letter “which also ap-
peals for political contributions to his organization—says in part:
‘Now Justice White is asking for your vote . . . . She wants you to vote
“Yes” for her in August. “Yes” so she can free more and more criminals
and laugh at their victims!’”117 Defending her record in criminal cases
in a campaign interview, White referred to her record and noted to
the media that in that record they would “find . . . 127-year sentences
affirmed and double-life sentences affirmed . . . .”118 With respect to
the death penalty, White noted that the canons of judicial ethics pre-
cluded her from speaking about specific cases but noted, “I took an
oath to uphold the laws the legislature has passed.”119
As Stephen Bright has noted, “Governor Sundquist and other op-
ponents of Justice White also made it clear that their successful cam-
paign against her was expected to influence the remaining members
of the court.”120 Focusing on the murder-rape case noted above, the
Tennessee Republican Party mailed a brochure to voters that asserted
115. Id.
116. Richard Locker, Conservatives Again Target Justice White, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, July
17, 1996, at B1.
117. Id. Although not directly germane to the larger thesis of this Article, it bears not-
ing here that in recent years I have had the privilege of getting to know Justice White.
Based on my personal experiences, and acknowledging that reasonable people can and do
disagree about matters of politics all the time—and that surely there were reasonable citi-
zens of Tennessee who opposed Justice White’s retention—the accusation that Justice
White would “laugh” at crime victims is outrageous. The accusation may have proven effec-
tive, but it was neither in service of truth nor taste.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 324
(1997).
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that White “puts the rights of criminals before the rights of victims.”121
Bright masterfully describes the disconnect between rhetoric and real-
ity as follows:
[The brochure] described the case of Richard Odom as follows:
“Richard Odom was convicted of repeatedly raping and stabbing to
death a 78 year old Memphis woman. However, Penny White felt
the crime wasn’t heinous enough for the death penalty—so she
struck it down.”
Neither mailing disclosed that Richard Odom’s case was re-
versed because all five members of the Tennessee Supreme Court
agreed that there had been at least one legal error which required
a new sentencing hearing. The court affirmed Odom’s conviction
and remanded his case for a new sentencing hearing. No member
of the court expressed the view that the crime was not heinous
enough to warrant the death penalty. Indeed, the remand for a
new sentencing hearing at which a jury would decide between the
death penalty and life imprisonment made it quite clear that the
court did not find the death penalty inappropriate for Odom. Jus-
tice White did not write the majority opinion, a concurring opin-
ion, or a dissenting opinion. Yet Tennessee voters were led to
believe that she had personally struck down Odom’s death penalty
because she did not think the crime was “heinous enough.”122
White became the first Tennessee judge to be removed since the
retention system was implemented for the state courts of appeals and
criminal appeals in the early 1970s, and then expanded for the state’s
high court in 1994.123 White reflected in later years on her non-reten-
tion experience, noting that “[a] controversial decision by our court
had prompted a landslide of opposition by special interest groups, po-
lice officers, and victims’ rights associations. The opponent was not an
individual, or even a declared group, but a concept—‘tough on crime,
soft on capital punishment.’”124 A decade ago in a paper prepared
specifically for the National Summit on Judicial Selection, social scien-
tist Anthony Champagne specifically highlighted Justice White’s cam-
paign as illustrative of the fact that while “[p]artisanship in judicial
elections is nothing new . . . there is a new level of partisanship
[that] . . . is not limited to partisan election systems, but can be found
in nonpartisan systems and in retention elections as well.”125
121. Id. at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. (footnotes omitted).
123. See Locker, supra note 116.
124. Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, One
Who Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 644–45 (2004).
125. Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1411, 1421 (2001).
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The “new level” of partisanship to which Champagne referred in
2001, regarding Justice White’s repudiation, from which we are now
fifteen years removed, and Justice Bird’s, from which we are now a
quarter of a century removed, is now very much the norm in con-
tested races.126 Yet the “new level” remains, for the most part, rela-
tively unusual in retention races. The events in Illinois and Iowa in
2010 likely flip the exception-versus-rule coin in retention races. Pro-
spectively, they likely flip that coin for good—whether for better or
worse.
III. Retention 2.010
To begin to fully appreciate the transformation to “Retention
2.010,” it is best to start with a statistical comparison. From 2000–2009,
spending on retention elections accounted for barely one percent of
campaign spending in state high court elections.127 By contrast, in
2010, “high-court retention elections in Illinois, Iowa, Colorado and
Alaska resulted in about $4.6 million in total costs—more than twice
the $2.2 million raised for all retention elections nationally in
2000–2009.”128
As compared to the Iowa and Illinois retention campaigns on
which this Article focuses more closely, the 2010 efforts to unseat in-
cumbent justices in Colorado, Alaska, and Kansas were less organized
and less consequential. In Colorado, a “527”129 group called “Clear
the Bench Colorado” described its mission as “to hold Colorado’s judi-
cial branch—particularly, but not exclusively, our Supreme Court jus-
126. See generally SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.
127. Id. at 14 fig.7; Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, 2010 Judicial Elections
Increase Pressure on Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.
justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/2010_judicial_elections_increase_pres-
sure_on_courts_reform_groups_say?show=news&newsID=9129 [hereinafter 2010 Judicial
Elections Increase Pressure on Courts].
128. 2010 Judicial Elections Increase Pressure on Courts, supra note 127. Former Colorado
Supreme Court Justice (a friend with whom I often agree, and occasionally spar) Rebecca
Love Kourlis asserts that the dynamics this Article dubs Retention 2.010 reflect “spillover
from the way in which contested judicial elections have been conducted over the last dec-
ade. There is leakage from that particular method of elections over into retention elec-
tions.” John Gramlich, Judges’ Battles Signal a New Era for Retention Elections, WASH. POST,
Dec. 5, 2010, at A8.
129. Named for the section of the Internal Revenue Code under which they are organ-
ized, 527s frequently make independent expenditures to support or oppose political candi-
dates. See I.R.C. § 527 (2006). For a more searching analysis of the distinctions applicable
to such groups under campaign finance law, see Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem  . . . and
the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 949 (2005).
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tices—accountable to the Colorado Constitution and to the people of
Colorado.”130 According to Clear the Bench’s website, the:
[J]ustices subject to retention by voters in the [November 2010
election] have repeatedly violated their oath to uphold our Consti-
tution and the rights of the citizens of Colorado – it is time for
them to go. Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey, justices Michael Bender,
Alex Martinez, and Nancy Rice have betrayed the trust of the peo-
ple of Colorado, neglecting the proper judicial function of uphold-
ing the law in favor of imposing their personal political will.131
Clear the Bench spent just $45,000 and all three Colorado jus-
tices retained their seats although the “justices’ margins of victory
were slimmer than usual.”132 The National Center for State Courts at-
tributed slimmer retention margins—not just in Colorado, but nation-
ally—to the general anti-incumbent bent of the 2010 election cycle,
noting that while:
[A]nti-incumbent fervor . . . did not [prove determinative] in
Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, or Kansas . . .“No” votes against judges in
these states were higher than they have been historically. For in-
stance, the 10-year average (1998-2008) for “yes” votes in Kansas is
74 percent, but none of the four Kansas justices on the 2010 ballot
received greater than 63 percent. Three Florida Supreme Court
justices saw a similar drop of about 10 percentage points in voter
support. Only two state high court judges on the ballot—both from
Maryland—outperformed the 10-year “yes” vote average for their
state.133
A. Iowa Retention 2.010
Iowa is often characterized as one of those non-political states that
has a pretty good balance . . . . This threatens to unsettle things.
—Indiana University Law Professor
Charlie Geyh in early October, 2010.134
130. About CTBC, CLEAR BENCH COLO. (Apr. 4, 2009, 12:30 PM), http://wwwlearthe
benchcolorado.org/about/.
131. Chuck Moe, Clear the Bench Colorado, COLORADOFREEDOM.NET (May 6, 2009), http:/
/www.coloradofreedom.net/wordpress/banner/clear-the-bench-colorado.
132. Matt Masich, Colo. Supreme Court Justices Retained, LAW WEEK COLO. (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.lawweekonline.com/2010/11/colo-supreme-court-justices-retained/ (noting
that “59.3 percent voted to retain Martinez, 60.2 percent voted to retain Bender and 61.7
percent voted to retain Rice” whereas “[h]istorically, justices are retained with roughly 65
percent to 75 percent voting for retention, closer to the lower figure in bad economic
times and the higher figure in good economic times”).
133. Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Anti-Incumbent Mood Extends to Court-
Related Elections (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/news-re-
leases/2010/election-roundup.aspx.
134. Grant Schulte, Iowa Poll: Retention of Justices a Tossup, DES MOINES REG. (Oct. 4,
2010, 12:33 AM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101004/NEWS/100403
23/Iowa-Poll-Retention-justices-tossup.
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In the spirit of “mighty oaks from little acorns grow,”135 the dy-
namics that swept three Iowa justices out of office in November 2010
are arguably traceable to a relatively ministerial act by Judge Jeff Neary
of Sioux City, Iowa in 2003. “It was ‘order hour’ at Woodbury County
District Court in Sioux City, when lawyers line up to ask judges to sign
routine orders.”136 Judge Neary “started to hand the papers back to”
one of the lawyers, when “he looked at the names” on a divorce peti-
tion and realized both parties were women.137 At that point, in
Neary’s recollection, the lawyer “explained to me they were legally
united in Vermont. They lived in Sioux City. They decided to go their
separate ways and wanted to do it legally.”138 Neary decided to let the
divorce stand, surmising, in his words, that, “[w]e have to figure out
how to deal with it. If people have disputes, and they otherwise live
here, then they should have access to the judicial system.”139
For that perfunctory decision, “Neary became the target of a full-
scale conservative campaign to unseat him—complete with accusa-
tions that he was a ‘judicial activist’ seeking to destroy the tradition of
marriage—through a barrage of radio ads, brochures, yard signs, and
protests.”140 In the words of one report, Neary “incurred the full wrath
of the Christian right.”141 “Focus on the Family founder James Dobson
even showed up at one rally in Sioux City to stump against Neary.
Warning a crowd of thousands against judges who create laws rather
than interpret them, Dobson alleged, ‘You’ve got one of them right
here, Judge Jeffrey Neary.’”142
Neary was a particularly strange target for this kind of opposition.
Through the years, I have had the privilege of meeting regularly with
many state court judges. Yet I have only met Neary once, when we had
lunch together at a small gathering in Washington, D.C. that focused
on courts issues. At the time, while we discussed his experience, I was
rather taken aback by how willingly he offered up his own personal
135. The exact origin of this quote is unknown, but some early sources are discussed at
Mighty Oaks from Little Acorns Grow, PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/
247100.html (last visited June 8, 2011).
136. Kathleen Burge, Iowa Judge Causes Stir in Granting Gay Divorce, BOS. GLOBE (Dec.
23, 2003), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/12/13/iowa_judge_causes_
stir_in_granting_gay_divorce/.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Michael Beckel, Lest Ye Be Judged, MOTHER JONES(Apr. 23, 2006, 11:00 PM), http:/
/motherjones.com/politics/2006/04/lest-ye-be-judged.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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opposition to same-sex marriage—almost by way of establishing a pre-
emptive context for our conversation. This personal narrative is mir-
rored in some of Judge Neary’s published interviews on the topic. In
his words: “The reality is this. Now you’re asking Jeff Neary what Jeff
Neary thinks, not Judge Neary, okay? Jeff Neary himself personally is
not in favor of same-sex marriage. Having said that though, I am in
favor of an equalization of the rights and responsibilities similar to
marriage.”143
Aided by a coalition of civic and legal leaders from both the left
and the right, Neary “raised an unprecedented sum for a judicial race
in Iowa—$27,735. Neary emerged victorious, but with only 58.9 per-
cent voting yes in a state where judges routinely get 75 percent or
more.”144 In the aftermath of the election, Judge Neary reflected that
“[t]here’s never been a judge [in Iowa] that had to face what I had to
face.”145 When spoken, his words were indisputably true. Today, he’s
but the charter member of a club—with opponents of same-sex mar-
riage again playing a pivotal role.
In 2009, in the case of Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa Supreme Court
unanimously invalidated a state ban on same-sex marriages.146 Based
on Varnum, Iowa became the first state in the Midwest to allow same-
sex marriage.147 To the extent that Varnum put Iowa near the fore of
the same-sex marriage curve, the decision was consistent with the
state’s history, and specifically the history within the state’s judicial
branch. As The New York Times noted, Varnum fits into historical norms
in that “[f]rom its first decision in 1839, the Iowa Supreme Court
demonstrated a willingness to push ahead of public opinion on mat-
ters of minority rights, ruling against slavery, school segregation[,]
and discrimination decades before the national mood shifted toward
racial equality.”148
In the wake of Varnum, two individuals, David Lane, a “southern
California operative, [who] began organizing religious leaders around
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
147. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2010, at A1.
148. Id.; see also Early Civil Rights Cases, IOWA JUD BRANCH, http://www.iowacourtson-
line.org/Public_Information/Iowa_Courts_History/Civil_Rights/ (last visited June 7,
2011) (summarizing early pro-civil rights cases decided by the Iowa courts, often years, and
even decades ahead of other state and federal courts).
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the country for political causes in the early 1990’s,”149 and Bob Van-
der Plaats, a Sioux City businessman and three-time Republican gu-
bernatorial candidate,150 led the group Iowa For Freedom, created
specifically to oust the three justices—Chief Justice Marsha Ternus,
Justice Michael Streit, and Justice David Baker. The group operated
with a combination of money and bare-knuckled strategies that
echoed the 1986 campaign that repudiated the three California
justices.
With same-sex marriage in place of the California hot-button is-
sue of the death penalty in 1986, Lane and Vander Plaats’s campaign
focused not only on urging Iowan citizens to vote “no” for the three
justices on the retention ballot, but also advocated the replacement of
the merit based system itself.151 Their cause was able to gain momen-
tum, however, from “steady streams of monetary support”152 from or-
ganizations outside of Iowa, such as the Mississippi-based American
Family Association,153 and individuals, like former House Speaker
Newt Gingrich,154 supporting the ousting of the justices. Nearly $1
million was spent on the campaign to oust the three justices, includ-
ing more than $900,000 by three out-of-state organizations.155
New Jersey-based National Organization for Marriage (“NOM”),
which spent $635,627—the largest amount spent by an out-of-state or-
149. Richard G. Lee, Behind the Fall of Iowa’s Judicial Gods, DALLAS BLOG (Nov. 23, 2010,
12:08 PM), http://www.dallasblog.com/201011231007382/guest-viewpoint/behind-the-
fall-of-iowa-s-judicial-gods.html.
150. Rachel Slajda, The Campaign You’re Not Watching – But Anti-Gay Groups Are, TPM-
MUCKRAKER (Oct. 26, 2010, 10:19 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/
2010/10/the_campaign_youre_not_watching_—_but_anti-gay_gr.php; Iowa Gay Marriage
Foes Emboldened by Judges’ Removal, GAZETTE (Nov. 3, 2010, 8:57 AM), http://thegazette.
com/2010/11/03/iowa-gay-marriage-foes-emboldened-by-judges-removal/.
151. Josh Nelson, Vander Plaats: Judge Retention Vote Just First Step for Gay Marriage Ban,
WCFCOURIER.COM (Oct. 13, 2010), http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/article_0c4d8312-
d6d1-11df-ac2d-001cc4c002e0.html.
152. Sarah Haas, Judicial Retention Vote Spikes Controversy, IOWA ST. DAILY (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_77068966-e792-11df-8a1b-001cc4c002e0.
html.
153. Curriden, supra note 2.
154. Jillian Rayfield, Newt Gingrich Helped Jump-Start Campaign to Oust Iowa Judges, TPM-
MUCKRAKER (Mar. 3, 2011), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/
newt_gingrich_helped_jump-start_campaign_to_oust_iowa_judges.php. Gingrich purport-
edly contributed $200,000 to the campaign for ousting the Iowa Supreme Court Justices.
Id. Executive director of Iowa For Freedom, David Lane, was quoted as stating that “[i]t
wouldn’t have happened without Newt,” who “had been courting evangelicals for some
time” and for whom “[p]art of that courtship included playing a pivotal role in removing
three Iowa judges.” Id.
155. See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or Ram-
pant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 120–21 (2011).
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ganization,156 used most of its money to fund two statewide television
ads urging voters to vote “no” and alleging that “activist judges on
Iowa’s supreme court have become political, ignoring the will of vot-
ers and imposing same-sex marriage on Iowa . . . . What will they do to
other long-established Iowa traditions and rights?”157 Another key
part of the campaign involved the so-called “Judge Bus” tour, a four-
day, twenty-city intrastate tour primarily funded by NOM.158 The tour
was “populated by stars of the anti-gay movement.”159
Against this spending and political savvy, and in a state where just
a few years earlier Judge Neary’s supporters spent the “unprecedented
sum” noted above of $27,735, the justices and their supporters were—
very much like the three California justices in 1986—flatfooted, con-
flicted, and confused. One observer vividly described the confusion by
noting that: “The pro-retention forces were caught off-guard and
scrambled to respond. But most of their efforts backfired . . . . Pro-
retention supporters were frustrated, but lacked the infrastructure
and planning necessary to channel it into something productive.”160
Supporters did coalesce to some degree, and, as Roy Schotland notes:
“$423,767 raised entirely in Iowa was spent by the Iowa-based Fair
Courts for Us Committee. That committee was one of three groups
supporting retention. The other two groups, Justice Not Politics and
Iowans for Fair Courts, did not spend on direct advocacy, but only on
educational efforts.”161 Even that comparatively modest total is mis-
leading though, because almost all of that money was raised in mid-
October or later, by which point panic had set in among
supporters.162
156. Jason Hancock, Anti-Gay Groups Spent $948,000 in Iowa to Oust Judges, IOWA INDEP.
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://iowaindependent.com/47598/anti-gay-groups-spent-948000-in-
iowa-to-oust-judges.
157. Justice at Stake Campaign & Brennan Center for Justice, Gay Marriage, Tax Fights
Spark High-Profile Court Races, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.
justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/cms/releaseelection_AC8E2D91225E3.pdf.
158. Slajda, supra note 150.
159. Id. An account of the bus tour describes some of the “stars” by noting that the tour
included:
FRC director Tony Perkins, former senator and likely presidential candidate Rick
Santorum (who once compared same-sex relationships to “man on dog”), Rep.
Steve King (who once said that same sex marriage would lead to the recognition
of incestuous relationships and socialism) and Rep. Louie Gohmert (who once
said that legalizing same-sex marriage would lead to the legalization of bestiality
and necrophilia).
Id.
160. Lee, supra note 149.
161. Schotland, supra note 155, at 120.
162. See id. at 123 n.22.
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The Iowa justices themselves chose not to raise money and not to
actively campaign.163 This was intended as a principled choice, in-
tended to keep the court above the political fray. Yet, however well-
intentioned, and no matter the amount of history on their side—and
without exception in Iowa, it was—that choice amounted to the jus-
tices’ Waterloo. On Election Day: “[T]he votes cast on retention set a
record for Iowa and were near the highest in any state ever. Normally
only a bit more than 60% of Iowa voters would cast a ballot on
whether to retain a justice, but 88% did so in 2010.”164 Needing 50%
of the vote to stay in office, each of the justices received about 45%,
and consequently, a “first” in Iowa Supreme Court history occurred
three times on the same day.165
In the aftermath of the election, the three defeated justices re-
leased a letter indicating their support for the state’s merit selection
system—a system opposed by, among others, Vander Plaats. Accord-
ing to the letter, while the “system helps ensure that judges base their
decisions on the law and the constitution and nothing else . . . the
preservation of our state’s fair and impartial courts will require more
than the integrity and fortitude of individual judges, it will require the
steadfast support of the people.”166
Speaking in New York on a June 2011 panel with, among others,
Hugh Caperton, Iowa Chief Justice Marsha Ternus167 first contrasted
the Iowa experience with that of Mr. Caperton in West Virginia. Chief
Justice Ternus noted that as opposed to the scenario in West Virginia,
where, in her words, “the money was spent . . . to influence the out-
come of a particular case”168 in Iowa, a larger purpose, and even a
trans-state purpose was at play, such that “the money spent in Iowa in
the judicial retention elections was designed to send a message of re-
taliation and intimidation to judges not only on the Iowa Supreme
Court, but more importantly, to judges across the country.”169
163. Iowa Gay Marriage Foes Emboldened by Judges’ Removal, supra note 149.
164. See Schotland, supra note 155, at 120.
165. Sulzberger, supra note 147.
166. Iowa Gay Marriage Foes Emboldened by Judges’ Removal, supra note 149.
167. In an interesting coincidence, like Chief Justice Bird who became California’s first
Chief Justice—and for that matter, Justice Penny White, who became Tennessee’s first wo-
man to serve on the state high court—Chief Justice Ternus was Iowa’s first female Chief
Justice.
168. See Brennan Center for Justice, Citizens United and the Role of Campaign Financing
on Elections, YOUTUBE (June 3, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYRKCzDTVjY
[hereinafter “The Brennan Center Video”].
169. Id.
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On the same panel, Chief Justice Ternus expressly quoted from
Varnum, noting the decision’s lack of effect on a religious organiza-
tion’s prerogative to define marriage as between a man and a wo-
man.170 Yet, she noted that, “notwithstanding the fact that the Court’s
ruling did not affect religious beliefs and practices, substantial opposi-
tion . . . came from individuals and groups who believed the Court’s
decision had violated God’s law or natural law.”171 From Chief Justice
Ternus’s perspective, the extent of that religious opposition was evi-
dent in an initiative called Project Jeremiah, through which, in her
words, “preachers were urged to use their pulpits to advocate for a
‘no’ vote on retention of the justices, notwithstanding that such action
might jeopardize the churches’ tax-exempt status,” and that in a few
instances, churches even applied for and received status as satellite
polling places so that congregants could cast their votes in the vesti-
bules while attending church services.172
Adam Morse, among others, notes that the “irony of the results of
the Iowa Supreme Court retention election is that it has no direct
effect on the legal status of same-sex marriage—Varnum remains bind-
ing precedent in Iowa.”173 Yet, consistent with Chief Justice Ternus’s
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Adam H. Morse, Second-Class Citizenship: The Tension Between the Supremacy of the
People and Minority Rights, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 1003 (2010). Although reserving a
more thorough treatment of the events that followed the Iowa election for future work, it
bears noting that the balance of the Iowa court that issued Varnum remains on the bench
despite a concerted effort by those who opposed retaining the Iowa justices, to then im-
peach the remaining members of the court based on their decision in Varnum. While such
an effort focused on the merits of an isolated court decision offends even the most basic,
fundamental norms of American society, it nonetheless had non-trivial traction including,
notably, with national figures who seized on the impeachment idea as a means to playing
to conservative Iowans in advance of the 2012 Iowa Republican caucuses. While the im-
peachment effort ultimately failed, an op-ed in the Washington Post framed just how dra-
matic a departure from rule-of-law traditions the effort was, noting that: “For more than
200 years, a safety barrier has protected our nation’s courts and our democracy. No matter
how controversial the case or unpopular the ruling, no state or federal judge has been
impeached for an opinion issued from the bench.” Bert Brandenburg, Op-Ed., End This
War on Judges, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604696.html. Writing about the im-
peachment effort, Ian Bartrum captured the absurdities well: “Anti-retention leader Bob
Vander Plaats—a failed gubernatorial candidate and former high school principal—lik-
ened the remaining justices to ‘teens who flee a beer party’ and called on them to ‘do the
honorable thing [and] share the punishment of their peers’ by resigning. I kid you not.”
Ian Bartrum, Judicial Retention and the Missouri Plan: Thoughts from Iowa, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan.
2, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/01/judicial-reten-
tion-and-the-missouri-plan-thoughts-from-iowa.html. Berkeley law professors Jesse Choper
and Herma Hill Kay solicited law professor signatures for a letter opposing the Iowa im-
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comment that the real purpose of the effort in Iowa was to “send a
message,”174 Morse asserts that “the net effect . . . however, may be to
deter future courts from interpreting their Constitutions as broadly as
they would have otherwise.”175
The fact that the justices in Iowa earned even 45% of the vote,
despite facing such organized opposition; despite being vastly out-
spent; and despite choosing not to utilize the only substantial pulpits
they had—the imprimatur of their own incumbency—and their per-
suasive abilities as advocates on their own behalf, is remarkable.
This Article posits that the electoral passivity of the Iowa justices
in the face of a prospective retention challenge will almost never be
replicated by serious retention candidates. The efforts of those who
opposed the justices, however, will not only be replicated, but will be-
come the playbook for those seeking to challenge incumbents in a
retention election. As Roy Schotland notes, “unlike the impact of the
1986 California event, which had occurred because of Bird’s consis-
tent reversal of scores of capital cases and had little if any ripple ef-
fects, this time several specific reasons point toward more challenges
peachment effort. See Ian Bartrum, Judicial Impeachment vs. Non-Retention Votes, PRAWFS
BLAWG (Jan. 13, 2011, 2:21 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/01/ju-
dicial-impeachment-vs-non-retention-votes.html. As one of—I’m glad to say—many to sign
the letter opposing impeachment, I think it also important to acknowledge that some
scholars, while nonetheless agreeing that impeachment was inappropriate, declined to sign
the letter merely because early drafts pointed to the legal and factual existence of reten-
tion votes as an alternative to impeachment. Respectfully, whether one believes in reten-
tion or not, this level of denial and disconnect from pragmatic realities—including those
discussed in footnote 77 and the text accompanying it—that lends credence to “Ivory
Tower” critiques.
174. See The Brennan Center Video, supra note 168.
175. Morse, supra note 173, at 1003. Charlie Geyh notes that the “the brave new world
of expensive, high-profile, hotly contested judicial races creates greater voter interest, puts
incumbents at higher risk of defeat, and to that extent promotes ‘accountability’—in an
unvarnished sense of the term.” See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection
Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1271
(2008). In a sidebar piece for the Columbia Law Review, David Pozen offers an account of
the events in Iowa through the lens of popular constitutionalism, arguing that “the fact
that three justices got thrown out for the way they decided a value-laden case is not, in
itself, evidence of an institutional breakdown. It is evidence of a healthy electoral system.”
David E. Pozen, What Happened in Iowa?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 90, 91 (2011), http://
www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/111/90_Pozen.pdf. In Pozen’s view,
“if you are appalled by the manner in which Iowans registered their dissent, then you are
appalled by the logic of judicial elections, and you probably don’t much like popular con-
stitutionalism either.” Id. I would argue that Pozen’s account is less of a challenge for “the
logic of judicial elections” than it is a challenge for those merit selection proponents who
have, historically, indulged the luxury of being able to champion the system’s accountabil-
ity mechanism to voters—without really meaning for voters to employ that mechanism. Id.
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to incumbent judges.”176 Consequently, retention elections have ar-
rived at a point where, prospectively, the pressures commensurate
with contested elections—fundraising pressures, attack advertising, in-
terest group pressures, and the tendency of judges to have, at least in
the recesses of their minds, an increased awareness of the possible
retaliatory impacts of their decisions—will become standard. The
Iowa 2010 experience ensures, in my view, that the two-sided cam-
paign mores of Illinois in 2010 will become the norm for Retention
2.010.
B. Illinois Retention 2.010
To compare Iowa and Illinois judicial selection in any respect is to
necessitate an ex ante acknowledgment that their cultures, traditions,
and systems are complete apples and oranges in almost every respect.
The lone commonality is that both states have retention elections.
Iowa’s history, prior to 2010, is defined by its system of appointments,
followed by sedate atmospherics of certain retention success. Illinois,
conversely is one of the states that, over the past decade, came to em-
body the new politics of judicial elections.177 The Illinois 2010 judicial
retention election is the state’s most expensive election of that kind to
date. Thus, while the 2010 retention campaign in Iowa marked a de-
parture from the norm of Iowa judicial selection generally, in Illinois,
Retention 2.010 was merely a departure from the subset of its reten-
tion—as opposed to contested—races specifically.
Make no mistake, though—2010 stands out, even in Illinois. De-
spite the expensive and bruising politics of contested races for Illi-
nois’s high court, the 2010 vote, in which Chief Justice Tom Kilbride,
needing a 60% supermajority for retention earned 65% of the vote,
was very much a radical departure from the state’s prior retention
elections. An August, 2010 editorial in The Chicago Tribune opened by
remarking that “[j]udicial retention races are usually about as exciting
176. Schotland, supra note 155, at 118.
177. See, e.g., James Sample, The Campaign Trial: The True Cost of Expensive Court Seats,
SLATE (Mar. 6, 2006, 4:16 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2137529; SAMPLE ET AL., supra
note 31, at 79 (highlighting the 2004 Illinois two-candidate judicial race between Lloyd
Karmeier and Gordon Maag in which the two campaigns raised $9.3 million, the most
expensive two-candidate judicial election in American history).
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as renewing your driver’s license.”178 The editorial noted that “[n]o
Illinois Supreme Court justice has ever not been retained.”179
Still, and despite that categorically pro-incumbent history, if the
spending in Iowa caught the justices and their supporters off guard
until it was too late, the warning signs gathered early in Illinois. Media
reports in early 2010 predicted that “[m]illions of dollars will likely be
spent on Kilbride’s election this year, though no one is running
against him.”180 Early in the year, veteran Illinois political observer
Cindi Canary observed that voters should “[p]ut on [their] seat belts,
it’s going to be nasty . . . . The Kilbride race in central Illinois will be a
very hot, very big money race.”181 In fact, it turns out that despite a
disarming demeanor that might best be described as that of an intel-
lectual “antipolitician,”182 Chief Justice Kilbride, on the other hand,
had the vision to see around the strategic bend earlier than most. Ac-
cording to Kilbride, “things started to pop two years before [his] re-
tention election in 2010.”183
Recognizing that dynamic so early on, Kilbride and his support-
ers did what Rose Bird in 1986, Penny White in 1996, and the Iowa
justices in 2010 did not—he organized early and well. In essence, he
took the fight to his well-funded, well-organized opponents, as his own
supporters raised millions in campaign funds. In a pattern reminis-
cent of Illinois’ controversial 2004 contested high-court election (the
178. Ameet Sachdev, Negative Politics Creep into Illinois Supreme Court Retention Race, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 24, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-08-24/business/ct-biz-08
24-chicago-law—20100824_1_retention-negative-politics-election.
179. Id.
180. Larry Yellen, Illinois Supreme Court Election Flooded with Money, FOX CHI. NEWS (May
20, 2010, 9:52 PM), http://www.myfoxchicago.com/dpp/news/metro/justice-thomas-kil-
bride-illinois-supreme-court-justice-20100520.
181. Id.
182. I coin the word “antipolitician” in this context because neither anti-political nor
apolitical is quite right. To be sure, judges are political actors, and politics—regardless of
selection system—are part of judicial selection. Here, however, I mean the term to reflect
that, in a more personal sense, utterly separate from anyone’s personal partisan inclina-
tions, is the kind of thoughtfully reserved citizen whom few would ever think of as a “politi-
cian” as that term has come to be somewhat pejoratively understood.
183. In June of 2011, I had the privilege of meeting with Chief Justice Kilbride over
breakfast, and then of appearing with him as a co-panelist at the ABA National Conference
on Professional Responsibility in Memphis. With his permission, I took notes on some of
his comments for purposes of this Article. Accordingly, this quote is from Chief Justice
Tom Kilbride. Thomas Kilbride, Chief Justice, Ill. Supreme Court, Comments at the 37th
ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility, Memphis, TN (June 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Memphis Comments] (notes on file with author).
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nation’s most expensive judicial election of all time),184 traditional
left-right fault lines were reinforced by particularly incentivized (in
their perception) medical and insurance interests. On the right, these
interests largely worked through the state Republican party in opposi-
tion to Kilbride. At the same time, significant segments of the left,
including particularly incentivized (again, in their perception) seg-
ments of the plaintiffs’ bar and union community, worked through
the state Democratic party in Kilbride’s support.185
While Kilbride indeed aligned himself as a Democrat in his first
run for Illinois Supreme Court, he did so only to conform to a state
law requiring a judge “to file under a political party the first time they
run.”186 Reflecting upon his first ten years as a judge in his retention
campaign advertisements, he assuredly stated, “I am not a Democratic
judge.”187 Further, public organizations similarly echoed Kilbride’s
self-perceived view of his own political neutrality on the bench. One
year prior to the anti-retention campaign in which the opposition to
Kilbride’s retention called him a “liberal, Democrat extremist,”188 the
Illinois Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates (“ABOTA”)
named Kilbride Judge of the Year.189 One of the fundamental goals of
ABOTA, a nonpartisan group composed equally of leading plaintiff
184. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 31, at 79 (summarizing 2004 Illinois judicial race
between Lloyd Karmeier and Gordon Maag).
185. See Yellen, supra note 180; see also Clare Howard, Justice Steering Clear of Politics, J.
STAR (Sept. 12, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://www.pjstar.com/news/tricounty/x531399511/Jus-
tice-steering-clear-of-politics. See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 25–26 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2010), available at http://www.jus-
ticeatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsReport2004_83BBFBD7C43A3.pdf (presenting a
compelling and dramatic illustration of the flow chart of money in such scenarios, origi-
nally prepared by the Illinois Campaign for Political Reform).
186. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(a) (“Supreme [Court] . . . Judges shall be nominated
at primary elections . . . . Judges shall be elected as the General Assembly shall provide by
law.”); see also 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 (West 2010) (“[T]he nomination of all candi-
dates for . . . judicial . . . officers . . . shall be made in the manner provided in this Article 7
. . . .”); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-10 (outlining format of petition for nomination).
187. Michael Smothers, Kilbride: ‘I am not a politician,’ PEKIN DAILY TIMES (Oct. 23, 2010,
8:00 AM), http://www.pekintimes.com/highlight/x1946664548/Kilbride-I-am-not-a-
politician.
188. Judge Kilbride Independent? No – He’s a Liberal Democrat, JUSTPAC (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.justpac.org/detail.php?c=2359971&t=Judge-Kilbride-Independent-No%E2%
80%94He’s-a-Liberal-Democrat; see also About JUSTPAC, JUSTPAC, http://www.justpac.
org/about.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).
189. Justice Kilbride Honored by Illinois Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates, CAN-
TON DAILY LEDGER (Nov. 21, 2009, 5:00 AM), http://www.cantondailyledger.com/news/
x215401115/Justice-Kilbride-honored-by-Illinois-Chapter-of-the-American-Board-of-Trial-
Advocates.
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and defense lawyers, is to “preserve . . . the independence of the
judiciary.”190
Despite the fairly neutral characteristics specific to Justice Kil-
bride, political forces larger than any one individual shaped the finan-
cial component of the race along partisan lines. The majority of
Kilbride’s financial backing came from the Democratic Party of Illi-
nois, which raised over $1.4 million in the financial record-breaking
retention election.191 Financially, the campaign also cleaved along
state border lines. While the majority of Kilbride’s financial support
came from in-state groups such as the Illinois Federation of Teachers,
the majority of the funds spent opposing him were sourced in na-
tional organizations such as the American Justice Partnership, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Tort Reform
Association.192
Kilbride’s campaign repeatedly sought to assure voters that he
had not been a politician on the bench nor would he, despite reluc-
tantly engaging in an active campaign.193 Even if one assumes, argu-
endo that all of the indications as to Kilbride’s non-partisanship are
false, it is telling that two other democratic justices who were also up
for retention in 2010 did not face significant opposition expenditures
and certainly were not forced to face the vicious attacks targeted at
Kilbride.194 In-state political observers posit that the real reason Kil-
bride—and not the others—became the focal point of retention op-
position had more to do with geography rather than partisan or legal
differences, particularly vis-a`-vis his two colleagues who were also up
for retention. One source put it this way: “Those advocating against
him say he is more vulnerable than Fitzgerald and Freeman, who hail
from Cook County, a Democratic Party stronghold. Kilbride, 57, who
was a Rock Island lawyer before his election to the court in 2000, is
190. Id.
191. Press Release, Ill. Campaign for Political Reform, Supreme Court Retention Election
Most Expensive in State’s History (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.ilcampaign.org/
judicial-retention-race-money-candidates [hereinafter Illinois Campaign for Political Re-
form Press Release].
192. Viveca Novak, Fact-Checking State Supreme Court Ads, NEWSWEEK, (Oct. 29, 2010, 2:24
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/29/fact-checking-state-supreme-court-ads.html
(“[The opposition group was led by the] Illinois Civil Justice League, which is funded by
business, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to go after Kilbride. The American
Tort Reform Association and the American Justice Partnership, which was started by the
National Association of Manufacturers, have also anted up to defeat Kilbride.”).
193. Smothers, supra note 187.
194. Sachdev, supra note 178 (“Kilbride is one of four Supreme Court justices up for
retention in November, along with Thomas and Democrats Charles Freeman and Thomas
Fitzgerald. So far Kilbride is the only Democrat being singled out by conservatives.”).
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from the 3rd Judicial District, which stretches from Will County to the
Mississippi River,”195 an area that is “traditionally Republican-leaning”
and the most likely chance for pro-business support.196
To the limited extent that “genuine motivation” matters are dis-
cernible, the animating issue for many of those opposing retention
was Kilbride’s vote as one of four justices in a high court decision over-
turning state-imposed limits on medical malpractice awards.197 Oppo-
sition within the medical community was so organized as to create
facsimiles of physicians’ prescription note pads, with each tear sheet
indicating a prescription to vote against Kilbride’s retention so as to
fix a crisis in medical malpractice insurance—and some physicians
went so far as to hand these “prescriptions” out to their patients.198
The Illinois Civil Justice League, a pro-business group that advo-
cates for liability caps and other restrictions on civil lawsuits, seeks
to raise $1 million to defeat Kilbride, said its president, Ed Mur-
nane. The group spent $1.2 million last decade in contributions
and ads on Supreme Court elections, mostly in 2004 to help
Karmeier get elected.199
The advertisements utilized to try and reach this goal took entirely
different means to this end. In a sharp disconnect from reality that is
familiar to incumbent elected judges in contested campaigns,200 the
anti-retention campaign advertisements—including those funded by
groups whose interests were entirely wallet-based—nakedly and dis-
tortedly attempted to paint Kilbride as soft on crime. The respected
website FactCheck.org framed a disconnect not only from actual pur-
pose, but truth as well:
Interestingly, the league isn’t going after Kilbride for his malprac-
tice ruling. Ads sponsored by the league’s political action commit-
tee, JUSTPAC, focus instead on Kilbride’s rulings on criminal
cases. “Our central issue is to remove Thomas Kilbride from the
bench,” the league’s head, Ed Murnane, told the Chicago Tribune.
“We will do whatever we feel is legal and we will be using whatever
195. Id.
196. Illinois Campaign for Political Reform Press Release, supra note 190.
197. See Andy Kravetz, Justice Defends Malpractice Ruling, J. STAR (Sept. 29, 2010, 9:12
PM), http://www.pjstar.com/news/x399785547/Illinois-Supreme-Court-justice-defends-
medical-claims-ruling.
198. Memphis Comments, supra note 183.
199. Sachdev, supra note 178.
200. See generally Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy,
Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 327 (2010) (“[T]he tough-on-crime message,
or some derivation thereof, is among the most, if not the most, prevalent in judicial
campaigns.”).
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means necessary and whatever issues will have an impact on vot-
ers.” He didn’t promise they would be truthful.201
Analyzing the soft-on-crime advertisements against Kilbride,
FactCheck notes that the advertisement “shows silhouettes represent-
ing three criminals, whose voices (done by actors) describe their hei-
nous crimes. The ad then says: On appeal, Justice Thomas Kilbride
sided with us. Over law enforcement or victims.”202 Writing for
FactCheck, veteran journalist Viveca Novak masterfully dissects and
positively skewers the claims. Unfortunately, millions of dollars in tele-
vision advertising to portray such falsehoods to voters guarantees an
exponentially greater exposure to the falsehoods than the truths to
which Novak points. Yet, from a jurist’s perspective, while countering
the falsehoods is difficult even with substantial campaign money, it is
nearly impossible without it. Rather than reproducing the entirety of
FactCheck’s analysis here, I merely recommend it in full, and note, in
particular, its concluding paragraph:
For the record, this supposedly pro-defendant, anti-prosecutor jus-
tice has been endorsed by the majority of members of the execu-
tive board of an organization of thousands of Illinois state troopers,
former Republican Gov. Jim Thompson, the state’s Fraternal Or-
der of Police and some state’s attorneys. The Illinois Judges’ Associ-
ation put out a statement condemning the attack on Kilbride,
urging voters to “Vote on the basis of facts, not propaganda or an
orchestrated disinformation media barrage.” The Illinois State Bar
Association protested that JUSTPAC “has distorted the record and
rulings of Justice Kilbride by characterizing him as allegedly soft on
crime and criminals.”203
Once under attack from pro-business groups, Kilbride declined
to take the position the justices in Iowa held. His open campaigning
ranged from commercials criticizing the campaign against him to in-
terviews about his background and career on the bench. However,
even in his own articulation regarding his decision to openly cam-
paign, he indicated a belief that he lacked any real volition in making
such a choice, asserting that “I have to stand up and protect my repu-
tation and fight for the integrity of the court system.”204 Despite Kil-
201. Novak, supra note 192.
202. Id.
203. Id. Contrary to the assertions made by JUSTPAC, in June 2010, “Illinois Supreme
Court Justice Thomas L. Kilbride was honored as the recipient of the 2010 Award of Excel-
lence in the Judiciary from the Illinois State Crime Commission during its annual awards
dinner program.” Justice Kilbride to Receive 2010 Award of Excellence, ALEDO TIMES RECORD
(June 17, 2010, 2:32 PM), http://www.aledotimesrecord.com/newsnow/x1224664381/Jus-
tice-Kilbride-to-receive-2010-Award-of-Excellence.
204. Sachdev, supra note 178.
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bride’s desire to keep the judicial branch separate from the campaign
rhetoric and promise-making, electoral necessity trumped ideological
removal from the political scheme. In his own words,
“‘[u]nfortunately, the opposition is not using fair tactics, they’re not
campaigning in a fair way . . . [t]hey’re misstating the record, they’re
skewing my record and in many instances they’re flat-out lying’ about
‘the impact of my cases.’”205 Thus, with his record under attack, Kil-
bride laid aside any qualms he had with political posturing from the
bench. If one takes Kilbride’s remarks at face value, then his
campaigning was much more to set the record straight than to be vic-
torious at the end of the retention election. Yet, with Kilbride’s suc-
cess that summer the potential threat of him being replaced by a
politically motivated judge fell to the wayside. Instead, the real prob-
lem moving forward becomes how to keep a judge who wishes to re-
main ideologically and politically neutral on the bench without
forcing him into campaigning—where neither of those characteristics
can realistically survive.
Conclusion
In the end, the foresight of Kilbride and his supporters, along
with the money and tactics they raised and employed, lifted the votes
in support of his retention above Illinois’s required 60% threshold.
Had the justices in Iowa—facing a threshold of only 50%—and their
supporters organized similarly, they would likely still be on the bench
today.
The contrasting approaches in Iowa and Illinois, and the similarly
contrasting results will, in this author’s view, become a self-fulfilling
prophesy. Those who seek to unseat judges for self-interested, ideolog-
ical and/or single-issue reasons will follow the playbooks of the reten-
tion opponents in both Iowa and Illinois. Judges and their supporters
will—in some instances reluctantly, in others not—model their ap-
proaches on Chief Justice Kilbride’s.
The contrasting scenarios leave open some empirically unanswer-
able questions. Did the Iowa justices’ principled stand not only cost
them their jobs, but embolden retention opponents both locally and
nationally prospectively? If so, will their principled stand—and it was
surely that—actually undermine judicial independence over the
longer haul? Could that passivity, sourced in concerns over the influ-
ence of money, actually have led to a scenario that ensures the cer-
205. Smothers, supra note 187.
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tainty of more fundraising not only in contested races but in retention
races as well? Unfortunately, while not empirically verifiable, I believe
the answers to these questions are likely affirmative.
Turning to Illinois, is it possible that Chief Justice Kilbride’s ap-
proach was every bit as principled as that of the Iowa justices? Reason-
able observers may disagree, but, given the circumstances he faced, I
certainly think that question too deserves an answer in the affirmative.
His experience, however, did not come without substantial costs, both
literal and figurative, personal and institutional. Those losses, while
harder to measure than the electoral losses in Iowa, are nonetheless
real, non-trivial, and cause for prospective concern.
In closing, while not the focal point of this Article, another event
on the same November 2010 election day reinforces the conclusion
that Retention 2.010 is, or soon will be, the new normal. Despite am-
ple investments of ink and oxygen, for more than a quarter of a cen-
tury, voters in the thirty-nine states in which judges face election have
overwhelmingly rejected every single proposed statewide move from
an elective to an appointive bench. In Nevada, despite efforts tirelessly
led by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, voters became the latest to
roundly reject such a change.206 In fact, at 58-42%, the margin of de-
feat was among the narrowest losses for appointment systems in the last
twenty-five years.207
For those who see merit selection as optimal for protecting judi-
cial independence, Iowa must be reconciled; decades of uninter-
rupted resistance to moving even to a system of merit-plus-retention—
much less to a system that lacks retention’s voter accountability mo-
ment—must finally be seriously acknowledged. Prospectively, address-
ing the new norms of retention campaigns is a necessity. Retention
2.010 is, unfortunately, here to stay.
206. Chemerinsky & Sample, supra note 35.
207. See supra text accompanying note 81 (citing History of Reform Efforts, supra note 83).
